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ABSTRACT 
In order to stop the climate change, socially responsible investing (SRI) has become largely 
popular in the United States of America, almost doubling in assets from 2012 to 2014. In 
addition to traditional SRI, the sustainable investing scene has found a new way of impacting: 
the Fossil Fuel Divestment Movement (FFDM). Since 2011, the FFDM has managed to 
gather pledges to divest assets out of fossil fuel industries worth over $3.4 trillion. The main 
purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the FFDM divestment announcements, 
endorsements and climate change news have an effect on four different indices and two US-
based stocks, which represent the four main features that could be affected by the FFDM: oil, 
gas, coal, sustainability indices and stocks. Excluding one global sustainability index, all 
examined US-based indices’ and stocks’ returns are statistically significantly negatively 
affected by the FFDM outputs.  
 
KEYWORDS: Socially responsible investing, Climate change, Fossil Fuel Divestment 
Movement 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
As the earth’s average temperature has risen almost 1°C in the past century and Greenland 
ice sheet is melting at an alarming rate due to a manmade climate change, people and nations 
worldwide have expressed their concerns. Scientist forecast the average temperature of earth 
to keep rising this century from 3° to 10° Fahrenheit, which has forced mankind to take action 
in efforts to save the planet. The temperature rise is harmful to the planet and to mankind for 
many reasons, mostly due to the sea-level rise and thus to the threat of major cities being 
submerged in the near future.  The single human activity most affecting the temperature rise 
and climate change is the combustion of fossil fuels such as coal, natural gas and oil for 
energy and transportation purposes. Especially stopping the burning of coal is essential in the 
fight against the climate change. (EPA 2016; NASA 2014.) 
In order to stop the climate change, socially responsible investing (SRI) has become largely 
popular in the United Stated of America, almost doubling in assets from 2012 to 2014. The 
rise from $3.74 trillion to $6.57 trillion in assets in just two years is a sign of the popularity 
of trying to make a difference through markets and investing. These socially responsibly 
managed assets strive to fight the climate change and other social issues through investing in 
sustainable options that value high corporate ethics and/or will endorse the communal and 
environmental well-being. (USSIF 2014.) 
In addition to the existing SRI, the sustainable investing scene has found a new way of 
impacting: the Fossil Fuel Divestment Movement (FFDM). Since 2011, FFDM has managed 
to gather pledges worth over $3.4 trillion in assets. The pledge for this movement is a promise 
to withdraw one’s investments from a fossil fuel heavy companies in the near future. These 
pledgers have mainly been religious establishments, universities, public institutions and 
pension funds as well as private companies. FFDM’s goal is to get the fossil fuel industry to 
leave the remaining fossil fuel reserves in the ground and change their operations so that 
carbon emissions decrease immensely. Furthermore, FFDM strives to affect legislation 
decision-making so that governments restrict fossil fuel drilling and issue laws that contribute 
in the fight against climate change. (Arabella Advisors 2015; Bloomberg 2015; SSEE 2013.) 
Many of the firms that are being divested from are US-based, thus this thesis will evaluate 
US-based oil, gas, coal and sustainable indices as well as stocks and use the S&P500-index 
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as a benchmark. Furthermore, one global fossil fuel free index is examined. SRI and its 
lucrativeness as well as the effects of ethics based divesting campaigns has been investigated 
by many1, but as the FFDM is a rather new phenomenon, few studies have focused on how 
have the oil, gas and coal industries suffered due to these divestment announcements, which 
by every measure seem significant both for the finances and the reputation of these industries. 
 
1.1. Purpose of the study 
The main purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the FFDM divestment announcements, 
endorsements and climate change news have an effect on three different US indices, one 
global fossil fuel index and two stocks, which represent the four main features that could be 
affected by the FFDM: oil, gas, coal and sustainable options. To be more exact, an event 
study is made to investigate whether fossil fuel indices or stocks suffer any negative abnormal 
returns after a divestment announcement, an endorsement or climate change news, or 
conversely, whether a SRI and a fossil fuel free indices gain any abnormal returns during the 
aforementioned event. Ball & Brown (1968) were among the first to use the event study 
method to examine a single event’s effect on market prices. This method is still widely used.2 
The events studied in this thesis are the announcements of new participants in the FFDM, 
endorsements of individuals/groups and news regarding climate change and its research. 
Many researchers have recently studied the correlations between investor mood and stock 
market returns. For example, Kamstra, Kramer & Levi (2000) show sleeping disorders, 
caused by the daylight savings time change are affecting stock returns. Furthermore, 
Hirshleifer & Shumway (2003) link the weather to stock returns. Moreover, Liston Perez 
(2016) finds that both individual and institutional investor sentiment are major drivers for sin 
stock returns, which by definition fossil fuel stocks are. The contribution of this thesis is to 
shed light on whether the FFDM is so influential that news surrounding the phenomenon 
affects the fossil fuel industries’ returns. As the FFDM has grown exponentially in the recent 
years, the media coverage from large newspapers3 has been increasing as well. This could 
lead to a major sentiment change among investors against the fossil fuel companies and thus 
affect the industry indirectly. Furthermore, the direct fundamental financial impact of FFDM 
                                                 
1 Such as Huimin, Cheung & Roca (2010) and Meznar, Nigh & Kwok (1994) 
2 For example Scholtens & Peenstran (2009). 
3 For example The Guardian (2014). 
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and arguments of incorrect valuation models in valuating fossil fuel industry are considerable 
due to the fact that energy companies are often valued by all of their existing natural resources 
which either way cannot be drilled out of the ground to the last drop, are considerable, thus 
making this thesis topical. (SSEE 2013.) 
 
1.2. Hypothesis development 
The four hypotheses are constructed by dividing the information in to different type of 
categories and testing the different type of categories individually against the S&P500-index. 
As Beal, Goyen, and Phillips (2005) argue, there are three main reasons why investors want 
to invest in a responsible way: to earn greater returns in the future, to push for a social change 
and personal non-financial goals. Similar to other SRI strategies, the FFDM is a result of all 
of these, thus these potential reasons for SRI are the backbone of the hypotheses proposed in 
this thesis. The obvious assumption is that the coal index and the coal stock will experience 
the greatest reaction to the examined events, due to the fact that the coal industry is rather 
small and illiquid compared to the oil & gas industry. Moreover, the SRI and fossil fuel free 
indices returns should not be affected as much, because although the money is divested from 
fossil fuel industries, it does not follow that the funds will be directed to a SRI or a fossil fuel 
free index approved alternative.  
H1: Fossil Fuel Divestment announcements cause negative (positive) abnormal returns in the 
oil & gas, coal indices and stocks (SRI and fossil fuel free indices). 
The first hypothesis is expected to be the most plausible in terms of affecting the examined 
indices and stocks. Amihud, Mendelson & Pedersen (2005) state that a decrease in the stock 
liquidity decreases the stock price, thus the fundamental effect of lost future investors 
affecting the future liquidity and therefore the future stock prices of oil, gas and coal 
companies. Furthermore, financing for the dirty firms become more expensive, as lenders 
will refuse to finance the industry4. The abnormal returns effect of a divestment campaign 
has been found to be positive for the divesting initiator5, but not many studies have examined 
the effect on the divested firms. Edmans, Carcia & Norli (2006) state that a low investor 
sentiment can lead to a hangover effect in the market, decreasing the liquidity significantly. 
                                                 
4 Bloomberg (2016) 
5 For example Grossman and Sharpe (1986). 
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Therefore, as an indirect effect, the stigmatization of the industry is hypothesized to affect 
the sentiment of investors towards the dirty companies, thus making the negative abnormal 
effect on the indices and stocks even greater through both direct and indirect factors. (SSEE 
2013.) 
The divestment announcements are divided by the type of the divesting party: public 
authorities, private companies and social organizations. This allocation is also roughly based 
on the asset size: public authorities such as pension funds often have the most assets to divest 
from the fossil fuel industry, private firms have the second highest and social organizations 
such as universities and religious establishments have the least to divest. Therefore, different 
entities’ divestment announcements are examined individually. 
H2: Fossil Fuel Divestment endorsements cause negative (positive) abnormal returns in the 
oil & gas, coal indices and stocks (SRI and fossil fuel free indices). 
Although lacking the direct effect on fossil fuel industries’ funds, the indirect stigmatization 
factor is worthy of consideration when examining the effects of the FFDM endorsements 
made by individuals as well as groups or governments. In January 2016, famous celebrity 
Oprah Winfrey endorsed Weight Watchers International and their products. During the same 
day, the firm’s stock price rose nearly 20 %.6 As many of the endorsements are given by 
public officials, the effect can be estimated to be much stronger due to the possibility of a 
legislation change. If some concern can get enough political will behind it, efforts will be 
made to solve the problem via legislative procedures. Regarding the fossil fuel industry 
controversy, the legislative actions could be for example high carbon taxing and air pollution 
regulation which would hurt the cash-flows of the fossil fuel firms and thus decrease the 
stock prices. (Fortune 2016; SSEE 2013) 
H3: All Fossil Fuel Divestment announcements cause negative (positive) abnormal returns 
in the oil & gas, coal indices and stocks (SRI and fossil fuel free indices). 
The third hypothesis sums up all the divestment announcements made in order to examine 
whether any and all kind of divestment announcements linked to the FFDM have an effect 
on the researched indices and stocks regardless of the entity. This hypothesis is important in 
order to decide how large the effect of FFDM as a whole is. 
                                                 
6 Fortune (2016). 
13 
 
H4: Climate change news cause negative (positive) abnormal returns in the oil & gas, coal 
indices and stocks (SRI and fossil fuel free indices). 
Firm specific research has found out that information revealing bad corporate rating for 
sustainability, for example environmental values, hurts the firm economically.7 Conversely, 
there are not many studies done on how general climate change news affect stock market or 
firm returns. The presumption is that a rational investor will change his/her behavior when 
faced with unsettling facts concerning the global warming and climate change research 
results. In addition to changing for example consumer behavior, one should change investing 
behavior as well, resulting in a divestment from carbon heavy firms due to their unsustainable 
operations. In other words, there should be an investor sentiment change towards these sin 
stocks that are the main cause of global warming. 
 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
This study consists of seven chapters, including the first introduction chapter. The second 
chapter explains more in-depth the socially responsible investing phenomenon. First, the 
definition and history of SRI is described. Then, different SRI-strategies are examined and 
the rest of the chapter is focused on explaining the Fossil Fuel Divestment Movement and 
its’ possible effects on carbon heavy industries. Also, background, reasons and other specifics 
of the FFDM are explained.  
The third chapter focuses on clarifying the theoretical background of this thesis, which 
include market efficiency and the introduction of different risk and return models. The fourth 
chapter discloses several previous studies made in the field of socially responsible investing 
and divestments. The fifth chapter establishes the data related to the thesis. The data consists 
of two US-based indices related to oil, gas and coal industry, stocks of two of the top carbon 
heavy US-firms, one US-based sustainability index, one global fossil fuel free index and the 
S&P500 which is used as a benchmark. Moreover, the data also consists of divestment 
announcements, endorsements and climate change news from various sources. Furthermore, 
the event study method used in this thesis is explained. Chapter summarizes the results and 
the seventh chapter concludes the findings and proposes some further research topics. 
                                                 
7 For example Beatty & Shimshack (2010). 
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Finally, list of the announcements, endorsements, climate change news and the list of top-
200 carbon heavy firms are attached in the appendix of this thesis. 
  
15 
 
2. SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING 
 
 
Socially responsible investing has many different aliases8 due to the fact that it can be 
approached from many different angles. The term used is often dependent on the SRI strategy 
used. For example, if one of the end-goals of the investment is to impact nature and 
environment, the term used would be green investing. Basically, SRI is investing in a manner 
in which one considers social, environmental and ethical issues in addition to the return on 
investment.9 In other words, investors seek financial gains together with a positive impact on 
different social matters. Schueth (2003) describes SRI as “the process of integrating personal 
values and societal concerns into investment decision-making”. Thus, three probable reasons 
for socially responsible investing by Beal et al. (2005) are: financial gains, non-financial 
gains and social change. Although these proposed causes of SRI together interpret the 
motivations of an ethical investor satisfyingly, individually, they cannot explain actions of 
one single investor. (Beal et al. 2005; USSIF 2015.) 
One argument for investing in socially responsible firms is that the returns one can get from 
them are greater when compared to socially non-responsible firms. El Ghoul, Guedhami, 
Kwok and Mishra (2011) find that firms which have a better corporate social responsibilities 
(CSR) have also a lower cost of capital. From an accounting based data sample of 12 915 US 
firms from 1992 to 2007, firms that scored a high CSR also had a mean of 0.56 % lower cost 
of capital than the firms that scored a low CSR. This statistically significant finding implies 
that those firms face lower risk and thus should be invested in. The lower risk of high CSR 
firms suggests that these firms also do better in an uncertain and volatile market. 
Furthermore, Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes (2004) conclude that socially responsible firms 
outperform financially in their empirical meta-analysis study of relationship between 
corporate social performance and corporate financial performance. 
Beal et al. (2005) propose a three way approach to the utility of ethical investment: 
1. Emotional returns of ethical investing are largely comparable to the fun of participation 
that gamblers enjoy. 
                                                 
8 Such as community investing, green investing, ethical investing, impact investing and shareholder advocacy. 
9 Horst, Renneboog & Zhang (2008). 
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2. Measuring the perceived level of ethicality in their investment decisions by adding the 
variable in the investor’s utility function. 
3. Comparing the ethical investments emotional returns to other emotional returns gained 
from different activities, such as sports or playing video games.  
Researchers have found that the fun of participation in gambling, is independent of the 
outcome of the gamble, if the size of wealth gambled is small compared to the total wealth 
of the participant. This implies that whether people gambling win or not, they get some 
mental gains from it. When this theory is incorporated into ethical investing, the potential 
total utility gained is the investment returns plus the emotional returns gained from 
participating. This outcome can be illustrated when the levels of utility of different investing 
methods are compared against each other, see Figure 1 below. (Beal et al. 2005.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Ethical Investor’s Utility Function (Beal et al. 2005).  
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Whether the investor loses (W1) or wins (W2) the utility of an ethical investment is positive 
compared to not investing at all. Conversely, if the investment is unethical, the utility is 
negative regardless of the outcome. (Beal et al. 2005). 
Harper & Leight (1993) define social change in three different ways: a significant social 
event which causes a change, social trends changes and a change in the social institutions or 
population. While one individual shareholder cannot cause a change in a firm, a group of 
investors can. However, the social change aspect and reasoning of SRI is caused largely by 
the same feeling as the fun of participating: The investors feel they are participating in 
making a social change and abstracting from supporting any undesirable activities, hence 
getting emotional returns even though no real, concrete social change has yet happened. (Beal 
et al. 2005). 
 
2.1. History of SRI 
The early origins of SRI come from hundreds of years ago when Jewish laws forbade 
investing in many unethical options. Furthermore, the birth of SRI happened through 
religions as different churches had morals and codes on how to act and spend money, which 
is partly the reason why SRI was referred to as ethical investing. The religious background 
can also be seen in the avoidance of sin stocks, which generally consist of alcohol, tobacco 
and gaming companies. Generation after another, religious people have tried to avoid 
investing in some unwanted cause. (Schueth 2003.) 
The current SRI movement originates largely from the middle of the 20th century, when many 
social problems were existent, from the Vietnam War to gender inequality, which were 
followed by the 1970s labor issues and anti-nuclear protests. Socially responsible investing 
came to mainstream when a large amount of investors put social pressure on the South 
African government by divesting out of the country in order for the local government to stop 
the racist apartheid. Nowadays, SRI has become more about the environment as people have 
awoken to the climate change and its’ effect on the globe. Nevertheless, social issues are still 
a topical part of the SRI movement, largely due to the recent school shootings and human 
rights issues. (Schueth 2003.) 
As stated in the introduction part of this thesis, in recent years socially responsible investing 
has doubled its size if measured by amount of assets. The size of the SRI phenomenon has 
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grown so large that academics are interested in studying the effects of SRI on the economy 
and companies financials. Moreover, with SRI being the fastest growing trend in the financial 
markets even legislative power has caught up with it: from July 2000 onwards, UK private 
pension funds have been legally obliged to consider the socially responsible point of view in 
their investments. (Bauer, Koedjiik & Otten 2005; Sparkes 2001; USSIF 2014.) 
Organizations such as the United Nations (UN) have also taken part in the SRI movement: 
Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) was founded by UN in the early 2000’s. PRI is 
an international group which helps investors to understand the basis of socially responsible 
investing and the implementations of it. PRI has already $59 trillion in assets by 1 382 
investors who have signed the principles. PRI has launched six core principles for SRI10: 
1. Incorporate environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) issues into 
investment analysis and decision-making processes.  
2. Be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership policies and practices. 
3. Seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which we invest.  
4. Promote acceptance and implementation of the Principles within the investment industry. 
5. Work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the Principles. 
6. Report on our activities and progress towards implementing the Principles. 
 
2.2. SRI strategies 
Broadly, socially responsible investing can be divided into three different strategies: 
community investing, shareholder advocacy and screening. Community investing refers to a 
strategy which targets people living in low-income communities. Investors put their money 
in community development projects that strive to help society members that have a hard time 
making ends meet in life through conservative ways. This kind of investing can help for 
example low-income community members to get business loans for their endeavors in case 
they are rejected by the traditional financing entities such as banks and credit unions. 
Shareholder advocacy means that socially aware investors try to affect in the decision-
making of the firm from within. As owners of the company, social shareholder advocates 
vote at company meetings in a way that benefits all stakeholders of the company, from 
employees to the environment. For these shareholders it is important to establish a 
                                                 
10 Principles for Responsible Investment (2015). 
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communication with the management in order to affect their opinions in social matters and 
thus usher the company to act in a more sustainable way. (Schueth 2003.) 
Screening is generally divided into two different categories: positive and negative screening. 
As SRI has become more mainstream, different corporate governance ratings of firms have 
become a large factor in deciding where to invest responsibly. Positive screening is a process 
where the investor finds the investment options with the best corporate governance and 
sustainability ratings. Negative screening is the oldest style of socially responsible investing. 
In negative screening, investors choose an industry in which they do not want to take part 
and abstain from investing in companies doing business in that specific industry. Usually, 
such industries include tobacco, gambling, alcohol etc. This thesis examines the effects of 
the Fossil Fuel Divestment Movement, which in a way is a type of a negative screening: 
investors refuse to invest in fossil fuel companies, but go a step further and even pledge to 
take their existing capital out of the industry. (Schueth 2003.) 
When talking about negative screening and SRI, usually the term sin stocks comes up. This 
term describes firms that have operations in socially reprehensible industries. Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009) state that “sin stock industries” usually refers to the triumvirate of sin, 
namely tobacco, alcohol and gaming companies. These companies are described as sinful 
due to their addictive products or negative effects on and consequences to the society. Sin 
stocks usually have less analyst coverage and they tend to be cheaper than traditional stocks, 
due to the socially aware investors avoiding investments in them. Because of this restrain of 
socially responsible investors, the capital flow is also much lower for the sin stocks, therefore 
increasing their cost of capital. (Hong et al. 2009; El Ghoul et al. 2011.) 
 
2.3. Fossil Fuel Divestment Movement 
Divestment is a branch of socially responsible investing, where an investor, individual or a 
group, anywhere from universities to public pension funds, withdraws its money from a 
socially undesirable industry or a firm. These objects of divestment are selected by negative 
screening. In the past, divestment campaigns have usually gathered supporters in three waves. 
At first, a core group starts to campaign against an industry which acts in an unwanted or an 
unethical way. Generally, the first wave is started by religious groups or industry-related 
public organizations. In the second wave, universities, cities and public institutions such as 
public pension funds come aboard to support the movement. In the third wave, the larger 
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market becomes aware of the divestment campaign and political decision-makers feel the 
pressure to change legislation. (SSEE 2013.) 
2.3.1. Introduction of the FFDM 
The starting point of the Fossil Fuel Divestment Campaign can be traced to the article of the 
American author and environmentalist Bill McKibben, which was published in the Rolling 
Stone magazine on 19th of July 2012. The article titled “Global Warming’s Terrifying New 
Math” explained how it is impossible to burn all fossil fuel reserves and still keep the earth’s 
global warming below 2 °C, which has been the target amongst the 167 countries that have 
signed the Copenhagen Accord (2009). McKibben (2012) states that all of the fossil fuel 
reserves cannot be burned, because this would produce carbon emissions five times over the 
carbon budget agreed. Therefore, McKibben (2012) urges for global fossil fuel divestment. 
Furthermore, oil, gas and coal companies are generally valued by their reserves, which would 
indicate that there is a carbon bubble in valuation of the firms due to the fact that either way, 
all of the reserves cannot be used if the goal is to keep inside the agreed carbon budget. (SSEE 
2013.) 
In November 2012, 350.org, which is a non-profit organization fighting against climate 
change, launched a campaign to get “institutions to immediately freeze any new investment 
in fossil fuel companies, and divest from direct ownership and any commingled funds that 
include fossil fuel public equities and corporate bonds within 5 years”. Moreover, 350.org 
request divesting from the top-200 publicly traded carbon heavy firms. The list of the top-
200 carbon heavy firms is attached in the appendix of this thesis. While there are not many 
studies done on fossil fuel divestments, some research has been done on South African 
Apartheid Divestment Campaign. The campaign was launched in the 1980’s to fight the 
racist South African government to stop the apartheid. The Fossil Fuel Divestment 
Movement is largely based on the success of this historic campaign. (Posnikoff 1997; SSEE 
2013.) 
The FFDM objectives are broadly based on the core principals of the South African 
Divestment Campaign. As mentioned in the first chapter, FFDM’s goal is to get the fossil 
fuel industry to leave the remaining fossil fuel reserves in the ground and change their 
operations so that the carbon emissions decrease immensely. Furthermore, FFDM strives to 
affect legislative decision-making so that governments put restrictions on fossil fuel drilling 
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and issue laws that contribute in the fight against climate change. The legislation changes 
include for example a large carbon tax which would decrease the profitability of burning 
fossil fuels. (SSEE 2013.) 
Similarly to the South African Divestment Campaign, FFDM started with just a core group 
of divesting investors who tried to get publicity for the issue. In the South African 
divestment campaign, the first wave of divestment were religious groups, but in FFDM the 
first wave of divestments came from US-based universities. To date, the FFDM has 
managed to gather pledges of assets not going to be invested in fossil fuels worth over $3.4 
trillion and $50 billion in total assets that are eventually going to be divested out of fossil 
fuel industry. Figure 2 below illustrates the divested assets by sector. (Arabella Advisors 
2015; The Guardian 2015.) 
 
Figure 2. Divested assets by sectors. Note: 82 % of institutions & local governments and 77 % of individuals 
reported asset sizes. (Arabella Advisors 2015.) 
 
On March 2016, the largest US bank JPMorgan Chase announced that it will not finance 
coal companies anymore. This news is important due to fact that JPMorgan is the second 
largest shareholder in the coal companies worldwide. Moreover, Norwegian authorities 
who are the fifth largest shareholders in the oil & gas companies have pledged to divest, 
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therefore one can assume that the FFDM can have an immense effect. Figure 3 below 
demonstrates the largest shareholders of oil & gas and coal companies globally. 
(Bloomberg 2014, 2016; The Guardian 2015.) 
 
Figure 3. Largest shareholders of oil, gas and coal companies worldwide. ($bn) (Bloomberg 2014.) 
 
It is plausible that the campaign has moved to the third wave: Public pension funds have 
pledged for divestment and public legislators are feeling the pressure globally as even 
private firms have taken part in the cause and due to the fact that governments are the 
largest entities divesting. Therefore, one should consider the impacts of the movement on 
the fossil fuel industry. (Arabella Advisors 2015; SSEE 2013.) 
2.3.2. Effects of the FFDM 
The FFDM’s impact on fossil fuel companies can be divided into two different categories: 
direct and indirect effects. The direct effects are the total capital divested from the industry, 
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changes in market norms and decrease in debt financing. The indirect effects include 
restrictive legislation and stigmatization of the fossil fuel industry. (SSEE 2013.) 
The direct impact of withdrawing capital due to the FFDM is assumed to be rather limited, 
because the funds which universities and pension funds hold in the fossil fuel industry are 
not that large. Only if the FFDM becomes globally large enough to get several private firms 
to take part, then the direct impact of capital withdrawing can be effective and significantly 
harmful for the industry. Moreover, the coal industry is going to be affected more by direct 
capital withdraw due to the fact the above mentioned industry is much smaller and illiquid 
compared to the oil & gas industry.  
The changes in the market norms can lead to a decrease of conventional channels of capital 
flow. The FFDM has already gathered $3.4 trillion in assets that are not going to be invested 
in the fossil fuel industry, which means that the future capital liquidity is lessened at least 
with that specific amount. Already a significant amount of assets, it has led to a snowball 
effect which only continues to grow and take away sources of a potential capital from the 
industry. This effect leads to a rising cost of capital for the fossil fuel companies.  
The third and last direct impact effect of the FFDM is the decrease of debt financing for the 
fossil fuel industry. When banks retreat from financing fossil fuel companies, due to their 
stigma or merely due to the bubble-like valuation of carbon, the cost of debt increases for 
these firms due to the restricted pool of financing. This impact can affect the decision-making 
of firms, rejecting marginal projects that are not profitable anymore due to the higher cost of 
debt. (Arabella Advisors 2015; SSEE 2013; The Guardian 2015.) 
Additionally, the indirect impact of the FFDM to the fossil fuel industry is significant. As the 
industry becomes stigmatized, investors have a very low sentiment towards the companies. 
Kamstra et al. (2000) link investor mood to stock returns and Edmans et al. (2006) find a 
negative correlation with the investor mood and liquidity. Amihud et al. (2005) state that a 
decrease in stock liquidity decreases the stock price, thus a stigmatization of the fossil fuel 
industry can profoundly lower the stock prices of fossil fuel companies. Furthermore, the 
companies can be for example neglected in future mergers and acquisitions due to the stigma 
attached to them. Also, the stigma of the industry can affect political will and lead legislators 
to set in place new laws to restrict the operations of the fossil fuel companies. All of these 
aforementioned impacts can have a significant effect on multiples and cash-flows of fossil 
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fuel companies due to the uncertainty around the whole industry, therefore posing a threat of 
decreasing stock prices. (SSEE 2013.) 
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3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
In this chapter, the theoretical background of this thesis is reviewed. The term market 
efficiency is explained and two different risk and return models are introduced. 
 
3.1. Market efficiency 
An efficient market is often described as a market which always mirrors the available 
information in stock prices. If the capital market is efficient, it should be impossible to beat 
the market, as the stock prices always reflect all the relevant information available. Thus, in 
an efficient market, investors are not able to make profits by buying undervalued stocks or 
selling overvalued stocks. Getting higher profits in an efficient market can be done only by 
investing in stocks that are more risky than others. Also, there can be a different kind of 
efficiency in the market as operational efficiency means for example that the trading costs 
are low in that specific market. An efficient market in a broader perspective of economics 
means that the market is allocating its resources effectively and frugally. (Fama 1970; Sharpe, 
Alexander & Bailey 1999: 92.) 
Almost half of a century ago, the efficient markets hypothesis was thought of being the 
prevailing theory of explaining the information’s correlation with the stock prices. Prices 
reflect information perfectly and investors cannot beat the market. The efficient markets 
hypothesis is often affiliated with the random walk hypothesis. Random walk hypothesis 
explains the randomness of the price’s change. The prices mirror the information correctly 
and immediately, the information comes unpredictably, hence investors cannot predict what 
is the stock’s price tomorrow based on the stock’s price today. Only tomorrow’s news can 
effect on the price of the stock tomorrow, regardless what the price was today. Therefore, 
anyone should be able to make investment portfolios as profitable as the portfolios done by 
experts. (Malkiel 2003.) 
Capital markets efficiency is often divided in to various levels through the information and 
the market efficiency terms. Viewing market efficiency through these terms, the researchers 
can determine are the stock prices predictable and can the stock price predictions be 
arbitraged in some ways. Fama (1970) in his widely known article divided the capital 
market’s efficiency in to three separate category of efficiency, based on information; weak-
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form, semi-strong-form and strong-form efficiency. The levels of efficiency are rigidly 
related to each other, as the stronger form of efficiency cannot exist without the weaker 
form’s terms being fulfilled first. Consequently, semi-strong-form terms have to be fulfilled 
before strong-form terms can exist in the market (Malkamäki 1990: 35). Figure 4 clarifies 
Fama’s (1970) levels of market efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The available information from stock in different efficiency levels and their relationship to each other. 
(Nikkinen, Rothovius & Sahlström 2002: 84.) 
 
Fama’s (1970) three levels of market efficiency levels are: 
Weak-form efficiency 
The stock’s price contains only the information of the previous prices of the stock. Future 
prices of the stock are random and cannot be predicted. Therefore, the investors cannot use 
arbitrage to make higher returns. In this type of a market the best investment strategy would 
be buy-and-hold. Autocorrelation and run-tests are statistical methods used to research any 
correlation between serials of stock returns.  
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Semi-strong-form efficiency 
The weak-form efficiency terms must be fulfilled before semi-strong-form can exist. Thus, 
in addition to historical prices of the stock, every bit of public information must be available 
and the security must reflect the information without a delay. Event study method is used to 
examine the effect of these public information releases, such as initial public offerings, 
annual and quarter reports etc., on stock prices. The semi-strong-form of market efficiency 
definition accepts small amount of delay in implementation of the information to the stock 
prices, although it requires that arbitrage is not possible due to these delays. (Fama 1970; 
Malkamäki 1990: 37.) 
Strong-form efficiency 
In the strong-form of market efficiency the share prices mirror all the information available, 
public and private. Private information is the inside information that companies executives 
and managers have that usually company’s interest groups such as stockholders do not have. 
The strong-form market efficiency is researched often via research problem “Can executives, 
who have inside information, create excessive returns?” There have been zero indications 
towards a strong-form market efficiency existing in any of the known capital markets 
(Malkamäki 1990: 39). 
 
3.2. Different risk and return models 
The capital market efficiency can be measured with different models. These models’ aim is 
to solve the required rate of a capital return. More frequently used models have often the 
same problem, which is that they tend to be very simple and plain. In this thesis, Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAP Model) and arbitrage pricing theory are reviewed. 
3.2.1.  Capital Asset Pricing Model 
The CAP Model is probably the most known return model used. The CAP Model is very 
simplified model and it was invented by Treynor in the early 1960’s. The CAP Model 
assumes that the major effective component of expected returns is the systematic risk. The 
CAP model is still used in finance by experts, although many of these models used are 
expansions of the original CAP Model. In order for the model to work properly, some 
assumptions have to be made. Before making any assumptions it is important to understand 
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the complexity of the capital markets and due to that fact the model is so stripped; defining 
the required rate of return, only the most important factors have to be observed for the 
purpose of creating as practical a model as possible. (Sharpe et al. 1999: 227.)  
According to Bodie, Kane & Marcus (2002: 264), these assumptions for the CAP Model are: 
there are no taxes and no transaction costs, all the investors have the same identical holding 
horizon, all the investors are rational (they choose the portfolio that has the lowest standard 
deviation given the required rate of return), all the investors share the same economic view 
of the world and analyze securities in a mutual way, all the investments are publicly traded 
financial assets and the investors act as though the security prices are not affected by their 
own trades. As is evident, these presumptions are so simplifying that they do not exist in any 
of the known markets today. These assumptions would require the market to be perfect and 
that all the investors would analyze the information identically. (Sharpe et al. 1999: 228.) 
The expected return-risk relationship equation in the CAP Model is 
 
(1) 𝐸(𝑅𝑖)  =  𝑅𝑓  + 𝛽𝑖   ×  [𝐸(𝑅𝑚)  −  𝑅𝑓 ] 
 
 
Where E(ri) is the expected return of a stock, rf is the risk free rate, βi is the beta of the stock 
and E(rm) is the expected market return. (Sharpe et al. 1999: 235.) 
3.2.2. The Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
The arbitrage pricing theory leans on the assumption that there can be many different factors 
for different stocks which affect the returns in an individual way. According to the arbitrage 
pricing theory, many macroeconomic factors and noise affect stock returns. Noise is stated 
as a specific event for any individual firm. The arbitrage pricing theory equation is 
 
(2) 𝑅𝑖 = 𝐸(𝑅𝑖) + 𝛽𝑖1𝐹1 + 𝛽𝑖2𝐹2 + ⋯ +  𝜀𝑖 
 
As one can see from the equation, the components are not fixed. In other words, the 
components of the equation can be whatever is specific for the company examined. Factors 
can be for example carbon outputs, currency rates etc. Basically, a company carries two kinds 
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of risks: systemic and systematic. Systematic risk is the macroeconomic risk and systemic 
risk is the risk relating to the industry and company itself, which can be ignored due to the 
fact that the systematic risk can be diversified in such a way that the systemic risk does not 
matter. (Brealey, Myers & Allen 2011.) 
The most used arbitrage pricing theory model is the French Three Factor model, which Fama 
& French (1993) invented after they found out in their 1992 study that the CAP model does 
not fully explain the stock returns. They claim that the stock risks are multidimensional and 
that macro-economic factors have an indirect effect on the stock returns through variable 
components such as debt, sales and profits. 
The Fama-French Tree Factor model equation is 
 
(3)  𝑅𝑠  =  𝛼 +  𝐵1𝑅𝑚  +  𝐵2𝑅𝑆𝑀𝐵  + 𝐵3𝑅𝐻𝑀𝐿   +  ɛ 
 
Where rm is the market return, rSMB is the return of a portfolio containing small stock in excess 
of the return on a portfolio that consist of large stocks, rHML is the return of a portfolio of 
stocks with high book-to-market value ratios in excess of the return on a portfolio containing 
low book-to-market ratio stocks. 
The additional factors rSMB and rHML have been brought to this equation due to the fact that 
small firms with a high book-to-market value tend to make higher returns than the CAP 
model predicts. With these factors, risk can be predicted better, as small firms can be more 
sensitive to the market changes and a high book-to-market ratio may indicate to some 
financial predicaments in the company. (Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2002: 311–312.) 
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4. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
 
In this chapter, previous studies regarding socially responsible investing and divestments will 
be introduced. Many of the previous studies done on SRI have concentrated on comparing 
the performance of selected socially responsible funds or indices. Furthermore, the 
performance of companies which promote socially responsible values has been compared 
against ordinary benchmark firms. Nevertheless, there are no wide scope of studies done on 
the effects of different divestments due to the fact that there simply have not been very many. 
Most of the divestment research focuses on the effects of the divestment of sin stocks and the 
divestment of the South African stocks because of apartheid. 
 
4.1. Socially responsible investing 
Schröder (2005) investigates 29 SRI indices globally and measures their risk-adjusted returns 
against benchmark indices. He finds that although the SRI indices as a whole are more risky, 
their risk-adjusted returns are similar to the benchmarks. Statman & Meir (2006) do a similar 
research with similar results: in the four SRI indices they study, no significant difference in 
returns is found against the benchmark index. Furthermore, Huimin et al. (2010) analyze 
seven different SRI indices and find no significant differences in the risk-adjusted returns 
between the examined SRI indices and benchmark indices. Based on these studies, the 
conclusion can be drawn that generally, SRI indices’ risk-adjusted returns do not differ 
significantly from the benchmark indices’ returns.  
Maybe the most appreciated study regarding SRI funds has been done by Horst et al. (2008), 
who study the performance of SRI funds with a dataset that covers almost all of the SRI 
funds world-wide, including 440 SRI funds from 17 countries with a longer time period than 
the previous studies have done. When using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), they 
find that on average the SRI funds underperform the conventional funds by 2.2 % – 6.5 % 
per annum. As Kempf & Osthoff (2007) remind, it is important to remember that fund 
managers are a possible driving factor when observing an actively managed fund’s returns, 
thus Horst et al. (2008) control for the transaction fees, and find that the underperformance 
remains significant. 
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Kreander, Gray, Power and Sinclair (2005) investigate 40 different European ethical 
investment funds and conventional funds from Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden and United Kingdom. Even though the ethical funds have a lower systematic risk 
and a lower standard deviation, there were no significant difference between the 
performances of the ethical funds compared to the conventional funds, measured by returns. 
Shank, Manullang and Hill (2005) examine different SRI funds returns against the NYSE 
Composite Index. They find that the funds do not create an excess returns against the 
benchmark, neither on long- nor short-term time-period. However, the fund that have the best 
responsibility rate beat the market returns statistically significantly, when looking at a ten 
year time-period. Bello (2005) study 42 SRI funds and found, that compared to the non-SRI 
funds, there were no significant difference in the risk-adjusted returns. Contrary to the 
findings of Horst et al. (2008), based on the above-mentioned studies, it can be said that the 
very best SRI funds in the long term can perform better than their conventional benchmark 
funds. This can be due to their insurance-style features against uncertainty in the market 
which is addressed in the next paragraph. 
Godfrey, Merrill & Hansen (2009) study a dataset of 160 companies from 1991 to 2002, to 
find out whether good corporate responsibility can act as a buffer against uncertainty in the 
market. They find that a good corporate social responsibility indeed gives an insurance kind 
of cover against events that are viewed as negative in the market. The good companies suffer 
statistically significantly less than bad companies. Furthermore, Mio & Fasan (2012) study 
the effects of good corporate responsibility during the financial crisis of 2008, specifically 
during the time that Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. Their dataset included 398 non-
financial US-based companies. They as well find a coverage effect against the negative 
impact of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Based on these studies, one can say that there is 
an insurance effect against negative impacts in having good corporate social responsibility 
among the firm. 
Konar & Cohen (2001) examine how the US-based firms’ environmental efficiency affects 
the firms’ value. They find that a decrease by 10 % in the emissions of toxic chemicals result 
in a gain of over $30 million in a company value. Moreover, El Ghoul et al. (2011) have done 
very robust research to find whether firms which have better corporate social responsibilities 
(CSR) ratings also have a lower cost of capital. From accounting based data sample of 12 
915 US firms from 1992 to 2007, firms that scored a high CSR also had on average 0.56 % 
lower cost of capital than firms that scored a low CSR. They point out that the findings should 
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suggest portfolio managers to invest more on companies that promote a good CSR and divest 
from companies that have a bad CSR rating. 
 
4.2. Divestments 
Theoretical framework is very limited on divestments due to the fact that there are not very 
many divestments. Scholars have studied the effects of SRI extensively but there are only a 
few studies done on divesting and divestment campaigns. Moreover, a large amount of the 
studies is done on the South African divestment movement which was in the 1980s. 
Therefore, in this chapter the studies done on divestments and especially research about the 
South African and the fossil fuel divestment movement will be analyzed. (SSEE 2013.) 
Many public and private pension funds started to divest their money out of firms that 
operated in South Africa in the 1980s. Institutional investors, such as universities, 
governments, non-profit organizations and pension funds divested an estimated $450 
billion dollars from companies that did business in South Africa.11This divestment was a 
protest against the racist politics which the South African government pursued. Blake & 
Sharpe (1986) examine the performance of a well-diversified US-based portfolio, free of 
companies that do business in South Africa versus conventional actively managed funds 
which has firms operating in South Africa, as well as benchmark indices such as the 
S&P500. The researchers find that the well-diversified South Africa-free portfolio 
outperform the benchmarks by a small amount, based on risk-adjusted returns. However, 
they suggest that the outperformance can be explained through the small-firm effect: 
companies that do not do business in South Africa were on average smaller than those who 
do. (Blake et al. 1986). 
Moore, Pruitt & Tse (1993) find contradicting results: companies which made public 
announcements to express their willingness to take part in the South African divestment 
movement suffered significant negative abnormal returns on the date of the event. Their 
dataset consisted of 43 companies and a time-period of 1984–1990. Furthermore, Lytle & 
Joy (1996) find the same effect with 113 firms that announced willingness to divest from 
South Africa from 1977 to 1989. They compared the LEAVE announcements of these firms 
to STAY announcements of 52 firms that were not willing to divest. The researchers found 
                                                 
11 New York Times (1990). 
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that the stock market reactions to the announcements of companies willing to divest were 
significantly negative compared to the reaction of the firms that stayed. The study 
concludes: “there was a negative wealth impact of social pressure.” (Lytle et al. 1996.) 
Meznar et al. (1994) find similar decreasing value effects on the withdrawing companies’ 
stock in their research and state that firm managers were not thinking about the interest of 
shareholders when they made the decision to divest. Posnikoff (1997) argues that these 
negative impact effects are found only due to the fact that the past studies have been done 
with a too long event window. She states that usually event studies examine only a short 
period of time to test how the market reacts to the announcement/news, and that for 
example Meznar et al. (1994) use a 40-day event window. Posnikoff (1997) examine 40 US 
firms that have a complete returns data during her research period of 1980–1991, and make 
a divestment announcement. She investigates the event day and the next day to determine 
how the market reacts to the divestment announcement. She found that companies 
underwent positive market reaction following the divestment announcement. Also, the 
trading volume increased, thus the announcement affected the liquidity positively as well.  
Kiyar & Wittneben (2015) examine the influence of Fossil Fuel Divestment Movement on 
the decision-making of the four largest German energy companies. With their qualitative 
data they conclude that other factors such as electricity prices, company ownership, 
government regulation and domestic energy sources influence the large German energy 
firms more than the FFDM on their path to a more sustainable business model due to 
climate change. Therefore, the FFDM does not affect their decision making directly. 
Nevertheless, Kiyar et al. (2015) state that in the future the FFDM can have major influence 
on company decision-making, mainly through political regulation. 
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5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter consists of introducing the data and explaining the statistical methodology used 
in this thesis. The Fossil Fuel Divestment Movement announcements, endorsements and 
climate change news are gathered from the Fossil Fuel Divestments Campaign site, which is 
the 350.org organization that leads the movement. Moreover, outputs are taken also from the 
newspaper The Guardian. The total amount of 73 FFDM announcements, endorsements and 
climate change news are collected 23.4.2013-29.1.2016. The daily closing prices of studied 
indices, stocks and the benchmark index S&P500 are retrieved from Datastream and from 
the S&P Dow Jones Indices website. (Gofossilfree.org 2016; S&P Dow Jones Indices 2016; 
The Guardian 2016.)  
 
5.1. Data 
The data consists of 73 divestment announcements, endorsements and climate change news 
which are collected 23.4.2013–29.1.2016. The FFDM started its operations in 2012, but the 
year 2013 was the first year that the movement truly gained speed as many new organizations 
pledged to divest. The FFDM has its own websites where the pledges and endorsements are 
listed. The links of the divestments on the website lead to the original source of the pledgee. 
The same system applies to the endorsements. Moreover, a large UK-based newspaper The 
Guardian has dedicated a website for the FFDM, where a series of articles relating to the 
Fossil Fuel Divestment Movement are collected. Thus, some of the announcements, 
endorsements and most of the climate change news are gathered from The Guardian. (350.org 
2016; SSEE 2013; The Guardian 2016.) 
The divestment announcements are divided by the type of the divesting party: public 
authorities, private companies and social organizations. Also, this division is roughly based 
on the asset size: Public authorities such as pension funds often have the most funds to pledge 
out of the fossil fuel industry, private firms have the second highest and social organizations 
have the least amount of assets invested. The specific amounts of fossil fuel divestment 
announcements, endorsements and climate change news are illustrated in table 1. 
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Table 1. Amount of FFDM Announcements, Endorsements & Climate change news gathered. 
ANNOUNCEMENTS ENDORSEMENTS CLIMATE CHANGE NEWS 
PUBLIC 
19 
12 
  
  
  
  
  
13 
PRIVATE 
7 
ORGANIZATIONS 
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This thesis examines four different indices’ as well as two different stocks’ returns and 
compares them to the benchmark index S&P500 returns. The studied indices are S&P Oil & 
Gas Exploration & Production (SOGE), S&P Coal & Consumable Fuels (SCBF), The Dow 
Jones Sustainability Index North America (DJSI) and The S&P Global 1200 Fossil Fuel Free 
Index (FFFI). The two examined stocks, Exxon Mobil (XOM) and Peabody Energy (BTU), 
are the most carbon heavy US-based firms in oil and coal industry, measured by their reserves 
of possible carbon output. Excluding the FFFI index, all studied indices and stocks are US-
based, as a large amount of the announcements, endorsements and climate change news come 
from the US. All of the indices are price indices, which means that the dividends are not 
added to in to the index price. In order to get a full estimation of returns before the actual 
event and its’ effects on the returns, the research period for the indices and stocks is from 
2.4.2012 to 4.3.2016. The price data is collected from Datastream and from the S&P Dow 
Jones Indices website. (Fossil free indexes 2016; S&P Dow Jones Indices 2016.) 
The S&P500 index was founded in 1957 and it is the first market capitalization weighted 
stock market index in the United States. It is supposed to serve as an overall indicator of the 
state of US stock markets. It is the best gauge of large cap US equities and it includes the 500 
largest US-based companies with a roughly 80 % accurate representation of available market 
capitalization. The S&P Oil & Gas Exploration & Production is an S&P-Total Markets based 
index (US-based), which was launched in 19.7.2006 and it consists of the 60 largest Oil & 
Gas Exploration & Production companies in the US. S&P-Total Markets is a similar 
benchmark index as S&P500, with an addition of small cap firms. The S&P Coal & 
Consumable Fuels is a similar index as SOGE, also based on the S&P-Total Markets index. 
SCBF constitutes from largest GICS Coal & Consumable fuel sub-industry in the US. (S&P 
Dow Jones Indices 2015.) 
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Found on 23.11.2005, The Dow Jones Sustainability Index North America is an index which 
consists of the best 20 % of North American companies measured by sustainability and is 
weighted by float-adjusted market capitalization. In this context, sustainability is defined 
based on “long-term economic, environmental and social criteria”. As of end of February 
2016, the top three industries represented in the index are Health Care (17.83 %), Technology 
(17.71 %) and Financials (15.09 %). Also, 92.08 % of the index is based on US companies 
and the rest on firms from Canada. Furthermore, as only the top 20 % measured by 
sustainability are picked on to the DJSI index, it increases the reputation of a company if it 
is included in the index. On February 2016, Microsoft was the number one on the list, in 
other words, it had the most weight on the index. (S&P Dow Jones Indices 2016.) 
The S&P Global 1200 Fossil Fuel Free Index measures the performance of global stocks that 
do not own any fossil fuel or have any fossil fuel reserves. In this context, fossil fuels are 
defined as crude oil, natural gas and coal. FFFI was launched on August 28, 2015 but the 
first value is dated back to December 30, 2011. The index includes 1 111 constituents from 
29 countries mostly from US, with an index weight of 58.8 % and 472 constituents. The 
largest sector by weight on the index is Financials, with an index weight of 20.8 %. This 
particular index is the only global stock index, and thus is not expected to react as 
significantly as the others on the studied inputs due to the wide global diversification. (S&P 
Dow Jones Indices 2016.) 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the indices sample. 
    Mean    Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis 
S&P500 0.034 % 0.012 % 3.829 % -4.021 % 0.830 % -0.2391 4.7564 
SOGE -0.041 % 0.000 % 6.843 % -8.503 % 1.691 % -0.2230 5.6839 
SCBF -0.161 % -0.051 % 17.589 % -23.898 % 3.196 % -0.1442 9.8418 
DJSI 0.021 % 0.025 % 3.552 % -4.114 % 0.817 % -0.2467 4.7712 
FFFI 0.024 % 0.040 % 2.871 % -3.681 % 0.720 % -0.3578 5.1644 
 
Table 2 represents the descriptive stats on the indices examined. The carbon industries’ index 
mean daily returns are negative, which is in accord with the expectation that the carbon heavy 
industries suffer due to the FFDM. Coal index has suffered astonishing -24 % returns at 
minimum and is also the most volatile of the indices. This is in accord with the assumption 
that coal industry is quite illiquid and thus volatile. Nevertheless, the skewness is negative 
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for all the indices, which implies that positive returns are more common in the sample. High 
levels of kurtosis of the carbon heavy indices explain the negative skewness: even though 
positive values are more common, there are extreme values in the sample. This can be 
observed also from the higher volatility of the carbon heavy indices. Conversely, for the two 
indices which are described as sustainable, the mean daily returns are positive but not over 
the mean daily returns of S&P500. The interesting fact is that both sustainable indexes’ 
volatility is less than the S&P500’s, which is in accord with previous research12, that being 
sustainable and having a good SRI can offer insurance against market uncertainty. 
Exxon Mobile is a US-based, the largest publicly traded international oil and gas company 
with global branches. XOM was found on November 30, 1999 and its’ headquarters are in 
Irving, Texas. The CEO of Exxon is Rex W. Tillerson who also acts as the chairman of the 
company. XOM was selected to this study due to its carbon heavy reserves; it is the world’s 
fourth-most carbon heavy and the most carbon heavy US-based oil & gas company with a 
total of over 8 000 billion tons of potential carbon output reserves. Peabody Energy is the 
world’s largest private-sector coal company. It acts in 25 nations on six continents and it is 
the world’s tenth-most carbon heavy and the most carbon heavy US coal firm with a total 
amount of over 10 000 billion tons of potential carbon output reserves. It was found already 
in 1883, and nowadays it employs approximately 8 300 employees. The CEO of Peabody is 
Glenn L. Kellow who acts also as a president of the company. The headquarters of BTU is 
in St. Louis, Missouri. (Exxon Mobile 2016; Fossil Fuel Free Indexes 2016; Peabody Energy 
2016.) 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the stocks sample. 
      Mean     Median   Maximum   Minimum  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis 
XOM -0.006 % 0.000 % 5.369 % -4.843 % 1.131 % -0.0009 5.8635 
BTU -0.475 % -0.124 % 39.891 % -35.328 % 4.864 % 0.1138 15.9373 
 
Table 3 represents the descriptive stats for the most carbon heavy stocks of oil and coal 
industry in the US. The carbon heavy stocks are also in accord with all the assumptions, that 
especially the coal stock would underperform and present similar figures as the indices: both 
                                                 
12 For example Kreander et al. (2005) and Shank et al. (2005). 
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stocks suffer negative daily mean returns and the standard deviation is quite high. 
Furthermore, the coal stock BTU has an astonishing minimum of -35 % and a standard 
deviation of almost 5 % daily. Combined with the positive skewness of 0.11, the descriptive 
statistics indicate that the coal stock BTU has suffered the most negative returns days in this 
thesis’ sample. 
 
5.2. Event study method 
As introduced in the theoretical background chapter, Fama (1970) divides market efficiency 
into three different categories: weak, semi-strong and strong form of efficiency. In this thesis 
the semi-strong form of market efficiency is examined. The semi-strong form of market 
efficiency includes all of the public information. The semi-strong form of market efficiency 
can be examined through an event study method. Event studies can be used in many different 
branches of science but in the field of economics event studies are used to measure certain 
events’ effects on companies’ value and returns. In order for an event study to be effective, 
semi strong form terms of market efficiency have to be met. This way, any occurring events’ 
effects should be reflected on the stock prices immediately. Thus, observing the stocks’ short 
term returns, events’ effects on the stocks’ price can be measured. Typical events which are 
measured with the event study method are for example interim reports, mergers and large 
acquisitions. (MacKinlay 1997.) 
Event studies were first introduced in the late 1960s, when Ball et al. (1968) examine the 
information in companies’ quarterly reports. The same methodology is used nowadays in the 
economic and finance research. The event study method does not have a unique structure, 
but is instead used to determine how an event affects company value and to find an event 
window which is the time period that the stock returns are examined in. Generally, the event 
window is longer than the event itself, for example at least the next trading day. This way 
one can observe the whole effect better. Furthermore, when the event is anticipated, the event 
window is stretched to even before the actual event itself due to the fact that markets usually 
have expectations towards an event which affects the stock returns. (MacKinlay 1997.) 
Event studies are used to calculate abnormal stock returns, with the assumption that the 
markets are efficient. In order to get abnormal returns, one must subtract expected returns 
from observed returns. The returns are evaluated daily, comparing the subsequent closing 
prices. When the abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns are obtained, the results must 
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be evaluated and analyzed using statistical methods. The purpose of this is to determine the 
magnitude of the events’ effect on the stock returns. The abnormal and cumulative abnormal 
returns are not absolute measurements, but instead they are compared to a benchmark, such 
as a common index mean returns. (Lee & Connolly 2010.) 
In pursuance of getting the abnormal returns, one has to estimate the expected returns and 
calculate the observed returns. Observed returns can be calculated using both absolute and 
logarithmic values. Typically, logarithmic values are used in event study research, thus they 
are used in this thesis as well. The observed returns of 𝑅𝑖𝑡 can be obtained with the following 
formula 
 
(4)   𝑅𝑖𝑡 = log [
𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
] 
 
Where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the closing price of index 𝑖 on day 𝑡. 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 is the closing price of index 𝑖 at a 
time of 𝑡 − 1.  
After this, the expected returns for the event window have to be estimated from the historical 
prices. Generally in an event study method, the previous 250 days’ prices are observed in 
order to create an estimation window. The estimation window is used to create parameters 
for the statistical model which is used in order to decide whether the results are significant. 
To make sure that the event window time period does not include prices from the estimation 
time period, the estimation window cannot overlap the event window. Therefore, the 
estimation period has to end at least a day before the event window starts. Because there are 
a lot of fossil fuel divestment announcements, endorsements and climate change news that 
may overlap each other, in this study the event window is only two days long. (Scholtens & 
Peenstra 2009; Posnikoff 1997.)  
Market returns model is the most accurate and most used method for an event study purposes. 
Comparing market model returns to market portfolio returns was first used by Brown & 
Warner (1980) when they measure security price performance. This method enables one to 
calculate the abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns. The market model includes 
econometric parameters α and β, which are called the ordinary least square estimators (OLS 
estimators). These estimators are obtained using market portfolio and the stock/index 𝑖 
historical prices. With these OLS estimators, the stock/index 𝑖 expected returns is a linear 
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function, where the parameter β is the stocks’/indices’ sensitivity against the market 
portfolios’ returns. The market model equation is  
 
(5)   𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖 𝑥 𝑅𝑚𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 
Where 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) is the stock/index i expected return at a time t, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the market portfolio 
return at a time t, 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are the estimation window returns’ OLS estimators and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the 
stock/index i error term at a time t. 
The stock/index abnormal returns are obtained by comparing the stock/index to the stock 
market returns. The stocks’/indices’ OLS estimators are obtained by doing a regression on 
the stock returns, taking the market portfolio’s historical returns from 200 trading days, 
starting 210 trading days before and ending 10 trading days before the actual event. In this 
kind of an event study, the 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 parameters are used to estimate the returns of a single 
stock/index for 21 days, starting 10 days before and ending 10 days after the event. These 21 
day estimated returns are then compared against the expected returns and the difference are 
stated as abnormal returns. Figure 5 below illustrates the event study timeline. 
 
Figure 5. Event study timeline. (Lee & Connolly 2010.) 
 
The error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is expected to capture the company related event entirely. This assumption 
is based on the theory that the company event information should not affect the returns of the 
stock in comparison to the market returns. According to the theory, the event should only 
affect the company related components. Furthermore, the error term mean is expected to be 
zero and the variance is expected to be constant. The abnormal returns of the stock/index, or 
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the error term, can be obtained from a modified market model returns equation. (MacKinlay 
1997; Lee & Connolly 2010.) 
 
(6)   𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 0) 
 
(7)   𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝜀𝑖𝑡) =  𝜎𝜀
2 
 
(8)   𝜀𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖 𝑥 𝑅𝑚𝑡) 
After calculating the abnormal returns from every significant day around the event, these 
abnormal returns are then added to cumulative abnormal returns.13 As Brown et al. (1980) 
use mean adjusted returns and state that the returns do not differ from results which are 
calculated with more sophisticated models, thus the simple model they use is sufficient. 
MacKinlay (1997) disagrees, because with the market return model the variance of abnormal 
returns is minimized due to eliminating the portion that is connected to the market returns, 
which leads to more accurate results when examining the effects of a single event on 
stock/index returns.  
In this thesis, the estimation period is always 276 days or more in order to get an accurate 
results, starting from 2.4.2012 to 22.4.2013. The estimation window ends always a day before 
the actual event. Posnikoff (1997) makes an argument for a shorter event window in 
examining the divestment movement announcement effects and getting accurate results, thus 
the event window examined in this thesis is the actual event day (day 0) and the next trading 
day (day 1). For example, if the event happens on Friday, the effects on Friday and Monday 
returns are examined. If the event happens on a non-trading day, only the next trading day is 
examined.  
                                                 
13 Morgan, Peristiani & Savino (2014). 
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6. RESULTS 
 
 
This chapter analyzes all the findings of the empirical study relative to hypotheses 1–4. 
Abnormal returns of four indices and two stocks are calculated from 23.4.2013–29.1.2016 
with the market return model, and a total of 73 events are examined during this time period. 
The effect of these events on these stocks and indices are examined through abnormal returns, 
which are estimated by comparing the examined returns on the benchmark index S&P500 
returns.  
 
6.1. Hypothesis 1. 
The effects of the different entities’ divestment announcements are examined in this part of 
the chapter individually. For example, Amihud et al. (2005) states that a decrease in  the stock 
liquidity decreases the stock price, thus the fundamental effect of lost future investors affects 
the future liquidity of a firm and therefore the future stock prices of oil, gas and coal 
companies. The first hypothesis is: 
H1: Fossil fuel divestment announcements cause negative (positive) abnormal returns among 
the oil & gas, coal indices and stocks (SRI and fossil fuel free indices). 
 
Table 4. Mean abnormal returns (AR) on day 0, day 1 and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for those days, 
after a social organization has announced to divest their investments. Significance of the findings are determined 
on 1%, 5% and 10% level, presented by ***, **, *. T-test values are in parentheses.  
Social Organizations 
 SOGE SCBF DJSI FFFI BTU XOM 
Day 0 AR -0.001 
(-0.327) 
-0.014* 
(-2.039) 
-0.000 
(-0.934) 
0.000 
(0.544) 
-0.021* 
(-2.488) 
-0.002 
(-0.971) 
Day 1 AR -0.000 
(-0.098) 
0.004 
(0.592) 
-0.001* 
(-1.971) 
0.000 
(0.410) 
0.009 
(1.024) 
-0.000 
(-0.095) 
CAR (0,1) -0.002 
(-0.316) 
-0.008 
(-0.870) 
-0.001* 
(-1.756) 
0.001 
(0.714) 
-0.010 
(-0.708) 
-0.002 
(-0.877) 
 
Observations Day 0, 
Day 1 & Cumulative 
 
18, 21, 21 
 
18, 21, 21 
 
18, 21, 21 
 
18, 21, 21 
 
18, 21, 21 
 
18, 21, 21 
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Table 4 shows the effects on the indices and stocks when social organizations such as 
universities and religious establishments divest their money out of fossil fuel investments. 
SOGE index experiences negative returns on all examined days, but not significantly. The 
same result applies to the XOM stock, which also experiences negative but insignificant 
returns. Furthermore, the FFFI index undergoes positive returns during these days but these 
returns are insignificant as well, which was expected due to the wide global diversification 
of the index. All of these three results fit the assumptions that fossil fuel heavy firms would 
suffer and fossil fuel free firms would benefit from the announcements. Nevertheless, the 
results are insignificant, thus the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for these indices and 
stock.  
One of the interesting significant findings is that the DJSI index suffers significant abnormal 
returns on a 10 % level during the day 1 and cumulatively. This is opposite to the hypothesis, 
but an explanation can be found when examining the DJSI index more closely: The DJSI 
index allocates 12.81 % of its funds to Oil & Gas sector, XOM being the top 2 component of 
the index with an adjusted weight of 5.59 %. This is surprising, considering the fact that DJSI 
is literally a sustainability index. In light of this information, it is not surprising that the index 
suffers significant negative returns. (S&P Dow Jones Indices 2016.) 
The remaining index and stock are the coal industry ones, SCBF and BTU. Both experience 
insignificant positive returns on the day 1 and insignificant negative returns cumulatively. 
However, both suffer significant negative returns on a 10 % level during the day 0, the SCBF 
index at -0.014 % and BTU at -0.021 %. Therefore, with a 90 % probability, the null 
hypothesis can be rejected for the SCBF index and the BTU stock: When a social 
organization announces to divest their investments from a fossil fuels, the SCBF and BTU 
suffer significant negative returns during the same day as a result.  
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Table 5. Mean abnormal returns (AR) on day 0, day 1 and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for those days, 
after a private company has announced to divest their investments. Significance of the findings are determined 
on 1%, 5% and 10% level, presented by ***, **, *. T-test values are in parentheses. 
Private 
 SOGE SCBF DJSI FFFI BTU XOM 
Day 0 AR -0.005 -0.004 -0.001* -0.001 -0.045** -0.003 
(-1.374) (-0.323) (-2.387) (-0.930) (-2.556) (-1.145) 
Day 1 AR -0.003 -0.017 0.000 -0.001 0.016 0.002 
(-0.745) (-1.100) (-0.387) (-0.718) (1.148) (0.744) 
CAR (0,1) -0.007** -0.022 -0.001* -0.002 -0.029 -0.001 
(-3.299) (-0.914) (-2.1) (-0.981) (-1.090) (-0.595) 
 
Observations Day 0, Day 1 & 
Cumulative 
 
7, 7, 7 
 
7, 7, 7 
 
7, 7, 7 
 
7, 7, 7 
 
7, 7, 7 
 
7, 7, 7 
 
Table 5 shows the abnormal returns which the examined indices and stocks experience when 
a private company announces to divest its money from fossil fuel investments. The SCBF 
and the FFFI indices are not affected by the private company divestment announcements as 
the results are insignificant on their part. Same applies to the XOM stock. Curiously, the DJSI 
index again suffers significant negative returns, now during the day 0 as well as cumulatively, 
with a mean abnormal returns of -0.001 % for both. Same explanation as above applies here 
for the DJSI index. The most interesting finding is that the SOGE index and, again, the BTU 
stock suffer robust negative returns on a 5 % level. Although the day 0 and day 1 negative 
returns are insignificant for the SOGE index, the cumulative mean return of those days is -
0.007 %. Moreover, the BTU stock suffers mean abnormal returns of -0.045 % on the same 
day of the announcement. Both of these findings are robust. Other results for both are 
insignificant 
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Table 6. Mean abnormal returns (AR) on day 0, day 1 and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for those days, 
after a public authority has announced to divest their investments. Significance of the findings are determined 
on 1%, 5% and 10% level, presented by ***, **, *. T-test values are in parentheses. 
Public Authorities 
 SOGE SCBF DJSI FFFI BTU XOM 
Day 0 AR 0.000 0.010 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
(0.141) (1.918)* (-0.393) (1.046) (-0.154) (0.512) 
Day 1 AR -0.004 -0.009 0.000 -0.000 -0.012 -0.005*** 
(-1.293) (-0.854) (0.057) (-0.174) (-1.085) (-3.293) 
CAR (0,1) -0.004 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.013 -0.005* 
(-1.034) (0.052) (-0.197) (0.668) (-1.258) (-1.881) 
 
Observations Day 0, 
Day 1 & Cumulative 
 
18, 19, 19 
 
18, 19, 19 
 
18, 19, 19 
 
18, 19, 19 
 
18, 19, 19 
 
18, 19, 19 
 
Table 6 shows the abnormal returns which the examined indices and stocks experience when 
a public authority such as a pension fund or a city announces to divest their money from 
fossil fuel investments. Against the assumption that the public authorities’ divestment 
announcements would be the ones to have the largest effect on the examined indices and 
stocks due to the possible political factors behind it, SOGE, BTU and DJSI do not undergo 
any significant abnormal returns during these events. Furthermore, surprisingly the SCBF 
index gains significant positive abnormal returns with a mean of 0.01 %, during the same day 
of the announcements at a 10 % level.  
The most interesting finding in this table is the very robust effect on XOM stock. The XOM 
stock suffers strong abnormal returns during the day 1 due to the announcements. The mean 
abnormal return of -0.005 % is significant on a 1 % level. This can be traced to the fact that 
out of the top five largest shareholders in Oil & Gas industry, three of them are governments 
(ie. public authorities). Furthermore, especially US pension funds and cities might have a 
large portion of their investments in the XOM stock. For example, on 23.4.2013, when The 
San Francisco Employee’s Retirement System (SFERS) passed a resolution to divest their 
investments from fossil fuels, the XOM stock suffered negative abnormal return of -0.019 % 
during the day 1. With a significance level of 1 % and an 𝑅2 of 0.65, this finding is very 
robust. One can understand the reaction of the stock on this single announcement, as SFERS 
holds over 112$ million worth of shares in ExxonMobil. Further research should be examine 
why the stock did not react significantly during the same day (day 0). Despite the day 0 
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returns, the cumulative mean abnormal return of -0.005 % were significant on a 10 % level 
as well, therefore, regarding the XOM stock, the null hypothesis can be confidently rejected, 
as the stock’s returns react negatively to public authorities’ divestment announcements. 
(Bloomberg 2014; 350.org 2013). 
 
6.2. Hypothesis 2. 
The effects of public endorsements on examined indices and stocks are viewed in this part of 
the chapter. Especially the endorsements of public and political figures can further stigmatize 
the industry, thus create unease among the fossil fuel heavy companies (SSEE 2013). The 
second hypothesis is: 
H2: Fossil fuel divestment endorsements cause negative (positive) abnormal returns among 
the oil & gas, coal indices and stocks (SRI and fossil fuel free indices). 
 
Table 7. Mean abnormal returns (AR) on day 0, day 1 and cumulative abnormal (CAR) returns for those days, 
after a public endorsement of the FFDM. Significance of the findings are determined on 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
presented by ***, **, *. T-test values are in parentheses. 
Endorsements 
 SOGE SCBF DJSI FFFI BTU XOM 
Day 0 AR -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.006 -0.001 
(-0.605) (-0.249) (-1.521) (0.168) (0.422) (-0.300) 
Day 1 AR -0.002 0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.036 -0.005* 
(-0.665) (0.105) (-0.519) (0.257) (-1.263) (-2.228) 
CAR (0,1) -0.006 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.031 -0.006* 
(-0.783) (-0.012) (-1.223) (0.869) (-0.991) (-2.255) 
 
Observations Day 0, Day 1 & 
Cumulative 
 
9, 10, 10 
 
9, 10, 10 
 
9, 10, 10 
 
9, 10, 10 
 
9, 10, 10 
 
9, 10, 10 
 
Table 7 shows the abnormal returns which the examined indices and stocks experience when 
a public figure or a party endorses the fossil fuel divestment campaign. Especially the 
political figures who endorse the FFDM can have an impact, due to the political factors and 
the urge to affect the political will. Although almost all of the indices undergo negative mean 
abnormal returns, none of them seem to have a statistical significance. This applies to the 
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FFFI index as well, which gains positive abnormal returns following the assumptions, 
however, the returns fail to be statistically significant. Therefore, for all the examined indices 
and the stock BTU, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected: endorsements do not seem to 
affect these assets returns. 
The most interesting item in table 7 is again the XOM stock. It undergoes significant negative 
abnormal returns during the day 1 and cumulatively both at a 10 % level. The mean abnormal 
returns for the day 1 and cumulatively are -0.005 % and -0.006 %, respectively. The 
endorsements are largely done by political figures, thus one can consider if the XOM stock 
is sensitive to public outputs that have political weight. Altogether, the null hypothesis can 
be rejected at a 10 % level: the XOM stock returns react negatively to FFDM endorsements. 
 
6.3. Hypothesis 3. 
The effects of all the divestment announcements as a whole, regardless of the acting party, 
on examined indices and stocks are viewed in this part of the chapter. This will give a good 
signal on how the FFDM announcements as a whole affect the researched indices and stocks. 
The third hypothesis is: 
H3: All fossil fuel divestment announcements cause negative (positive) abnormal returns 
among the oil & gas, coal indices and stocks (SRI and fossil fuel free indices).
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Table 8. Mean abnormal returns (AR) on day 0, day 1 and cumulative abnormal (CAR) returns for those days, 
after all of the observed divestment announcements, regardless of the divesting party. Significance of the 
findings are determined on 1%, 5% and 10% level, presented by ***, **, *. T-test values are in parentheses. 
All Divestment Announcements 
 SOGE SCBF DJSI FFFI BTU XOM 
Day 0 AR -0.001 -0.003 -0.0004* 0.000 -0.018*** -0.001 
(-0.419) (-0.568) (-1.706) (0.684) (-2.954) (-0.735) 
Day 1 AR -0.002 -0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.002* 
(1.105) (-0.752) (1.503) (0.140) (0.207) (1.733) 
CAR (0,1) -0.003 -0.007 -0.001** 0.000 -0.015 -0.003* 
(-1.138) (-0.980) (-2.045) (0.654) (-1.674) (-1.987) 
 
Observations Day 0, 
Day 1 & Cumulative 
 
40, 45, 45 
 
40, 45, 45 
 
40, 45, 45 
 
40, 45, 45 
 
41, 45, 45 
 
41, 45, 45 
 
Table 8 shows the abnormal returns on how the examined indices and stocks react when 
studying all of the observed divestment announcements, regardless of the divesting party. In 
essence, table 8 shows what kind of an effect the FFDM has a whole on the examined indices 
and stocks as all announcement are taken in to consideration. SOGE and SCBF indices suffer 
abnormal returns after the announcements, but the abnormal returns are insignificant. 
Similarly, according to the assumptions, the FFFI index gains abnormal returns, but which 
fail to be statistically significant again. Thus, regarding the indices SOGE, SCBF and FFFI, 
it can be stated that the researched divestment announcements as a whole do not cause any 
significant abnormal returns within these indices. The null hypothesis is accepted. 
DJSI index against all assumptions and hypotheses development suffers significant negative 
abnormal returns during the same day (-0.0004 %) of the announcement and cumulatively as 
well (-0,001 %). This is an eye opening finding, because an individual investor might invest 
in to the DJSI index thinking that the investment has an insurance against volatility and 
negative news, as previous research has found. This finding proofs on a 90 % probability, 
that the sustainability index does not offer an insurance against the Fossil Fuel Divestment 
Campaign, but actually reacts vice versa. As discussed earlier, the underperformance of this 
index during the divestment announcements can be traced due to the fact that the index has 
12.81 % of its funds in Oil & Gas sector, for example XOM stock being the top 2 component 
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of the index. Further research should be done on finding out if the portfolio allocation is the 
main driver of the negative abnormal returns. 
When looking at the stock results, it can be seen that the XOM stock reacts negatively to all 
divestment announcements during the day 1 and cumulatively. The negative abnormal 
returns of -0.002 and -0.003 are both significant on a 10 % level, which leads to a rejection 
of the null hypothesis. Furthermore, the BTU stock suffers a -0.018 % abnormal returns on 
the same day of all of the announcements. This finding is very robust, thus with a 99 % 
probability the null hypothesis can be rejected: BTU stock reacts negatively during the same 
day to the divestment announcements of the FFDM.  
 
6.4. Hypothesis 4. 
The effects of climate change news on examined indices and stocks are viewed in this part 
of the chapter. The idea behind the hypothesis is that the investor changes his/her investment 
behavior in light of a new unsettling news of global warming. In other words, divestment 
from a fossil fuel heavy industries as they are one of the main causes for the global warming. 
The fourth hypothesis goes as follows: 
H4: Climate change news cause negative (positive) abnormal returns among the oil & gas, 
coal indices and stocks (SRI and fossil fuel free indices).
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Table 9. Mean abnormal returns (AR) on day 0, day 1 and cumulative abnormal (CAR) returns for those days, 
after a climate change news. Significance of the findings are determined on 1%, 5% and 10% level, presented 
by ***, **, *. T-test values are in parentheses. 
Climate Change News 
 SOGE SCBF DJSI FFFI BTU XOM 
Day 0 AR 0.003 0.015 0.001 0.003 0.016* -0.003 
(0.376) (0.733) (0.826) (1.150) (1.88) (-0.800) 
Day 1 AR 0.015** 0.020 0.000 0.022 0.004 0.001 
(2.820) (1.305) (0.816) (0.760) (0.443) (0.355) 
CAR (0,1) 0.018 0.035 0.001 0.005 0.020* -0.002 
(1.760) (1.351) (0.968) (1.564) (2.067) (-0.373) 
 
Observations Day 0, 
Day 1 & Cumulative 
 
13, 13, 13 
 
13, 13, 13 
 
13, 13, 13 
 
13, 13, 13 
 
13, 13, 13 
 
13, 13, 13 
 
Table 9 shows the abnormal returns on how the examined indices and stocks react when 
testing climate change news. This is only loosely connected with the main part of the thesis, 
which shows also in the results. Major part of the indices do not react to the climate change 
news. This concerns of SCBF, DJSI and FFI. Also, the XOM stock does not react. 
Surprisingly, the SOGE index and the BTU stock both gain some significant abnormal 
returns: BTU cumulatively and during the same day of the climate change news. Both at a 
10 % level. SOGE oddly enough gains significant abnormal returns on the day 1, at a 5 % 
level. These results are against the assumptions and work as an opening puzzle for further 
research on climate change news affecting stock and index returns. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
In order to stop the climate change, socially responsible investing (SRI) has become largely 
popular in the United Stated of America, almost doubling in assets from 2012 to 2014. In 
addition to the traditional SRI, the sustainable investing scene has found a new way of 
impacting: the Fossil Fuel Divestment Movement (FFDM). Since, the FFDM has managed 
to gather pledges worth over $3.4 trillion in assets. The main purpose of this thesis is to 
examine whether the FFDM divestment announcements, endorsements and climate change 
news have an effect on three different US indices, one global index and two stocks, which 
consist of the four main features that could be affected by the FFDM: oil, gas, coal and 
sustainable assets.  (Arabella Advisors 2015; USSIF 2014.) 
To be more exact, an event study was made to investigate whether fossil fuel indices or stocks 
suffer any negative abnormal returns after a divestment announcement, endorsement or a 
climate change news, or conversely, whether SRI and fossil fuel free indices gain any 
abnormal returns during the aforementioned event. The researched indices are S&P Oil & 
Gas Exploration & Production (SOGE), S&P Coal & Consumable Fuels (SCBF), The Dow 
Jones Sustainability Index North America (DJSI) and The S&P Global 1200 Fossil Fuel Free 
Index (FFFI). The two examined stocks, Exxon Mobil (XOM) and Peabody Energy (BTU), 
Although getting positive abnormal returns throughout the tables, FFFI is the only examined 
index that did not react significantly to any of the studied announcements, news or 
endorsements. This is expected, as the index is global, and a large part of the outputs studied 
are US-based. Thus, with a great confidence, one can say that the FFDM outputs does not 
have an effect on the FFFI index. 
The other sustainable index examined is a more complex issue and the second most important 
finding of this thesis is connected to it. The assumption that the sustainable option should 
benefit after a divestment announcement, in light of the evidence, is wrong. Excluding public 
authorities divestment announcements, all the other announcements and endorsements affect 
the DJSI index to suffer significant negative cumulative abnormal returns. One explanation 
for the effect can be based on the fact that the DJSI index allocates 12.81 % its funds to Oil 
& Gas sector, XOM being the top 2 component of the index with an adjusted weight of 5.59 
%. This finding is important, because an individual investor might invest in the DJSI index 
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thinking that the investment has an insurance against volatility and negative news. This 
finding proves with a 90 % probability that the sustainability index does not offer insurance 
against the Fossil Fuel Divestment Campaign, but actually reacts vice versa. Further research 
should concentrate on examining whether the large proportion of fossil fuel portfolio 
allocation is the main driver for the effect. 
SOGE index reacts strongly only to the divestment announcements of private firms. This 
effect is very robust, and with a 99 % probability the null hypothesis can be rejected. Other 
findings were not found significant for SOGE.  
The SCBF index reacted only to social organizations divestment announcements. The 10 % 
level significance for these announcements was the only statistically significant result for 
SCBF. Based on these findings arises a question, whether the indices are so well diversified 
that the effect of a direct divestment will not affect them largely. Thus, further research 
should continue either by concentrating on stocks or finding indices that are heavily weighted 
by stocks that react strongly to divestment announcements of the FFDM, for example the top 
200 carbon heavy stocks. 
Climate change news portion of this thesis offers some interesting results. Some of the indices 
and stocks actually gained statistically significant abnormal returns after climate change 
news. This is completely opposite to the fourth hypothesis. Due to the similarity of the 
significant results, further research should use these positive abnormal returns as a base to 
study the explanation behind the effect. 
The most important and interesting result of this thesis is the existence of negative abnormal 
returns regarding the examined stocks. Excluding the public authorities announcements, the 
BTU stock suffers significant negative abnormal returns during the day of all of the examined 
divestment announcements. Furthermore, regarding the hypothesis 3, when studying all of 
the divestment announcements as a single group, BTU has a 99 % probability to experience 
negative abnormal returns during the day of any kind of divestment announcement, 
regardless of the divestor. This is a robust indicator that all FFDM outputs have an effect on 
the stock.  
The XOM stock suffers similar effects. The most important finding for the XOM concerns 
the divestment announcement made by public authorities: the next day after the 
announcement has been made, the XOM suffers statistically significant negative abnormal 
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returns with a 99 % probability. This is not a surprise, as of the top five largest shareholders 
in Oil & Gas industry, three are governments (i.e. public authorities). Furthermore, especially 
US pension funds and cities might have a large portion of their investments in the XOM 
stock. One example of this was observed when on 23.4.2014, The San Francisco Employee’s 
Retirement System (SFERS) passed a resolution to divest their investments from fossil fuels. 
This affected the XOM stock to suffer an abnormal return of -0.019 % during day 1. With a 
significance level of 1 % and an 𝑅2 of 0.65, this finding is very robust. One can understand 
the reaction of the stock on this single announcement, as SFERS holds over $112 million 
worth of shares in ExxonMobil. (350.org 2013; Bloomberg 2014.) 
Further research should be done with a larger dataset to find more stocks that seem to be 
sensitive to the divestment announcements of the FFDM, because obviously there seem to 
be a connection on the fossil fuel stock returns and the divestment announcements. The best 
proponents for sensitive stocks would be the top 200 carbon list. If enough stocks are found, 
one can study the true effect of the FFDM on the fossil fuel industry. The FFDM has just 
started to build up steam in late 2015 and as more and more advocates have backed up the 
campaign, the effect can be much stronger in the future. Moreover, as the Paris 2015 Climate 
Summit agreement was signed on 22.4.2016, the war against climate change has merely 
begun. (BBC 2016; SSEE 2013.) 
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APPENDIX 
1. Appendix 
All the gathered outputs by date and type. 
 
Sarake2 Climate Change News  
Date Output World Wide Web source 
17.12.2014 With unresolved health risks and few signs of 
an economic boom, Cuomo to ban gas 
fracking 
http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/17/with-
unresolved-health-risks-and-few-signs-of-an-economic-boon-
cuomo-to-ban-gas-fracking/ 
4.3.2015 Fracking chemicals detected in Pennsylvania 
drinking water 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/05/science/earth/fracking
-chemicals-detected-in-pennsylvania-drinking-water.html 
20.3.2015 New federal rules are set for fracking http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/21/us/politics/obama-
administration-unveils-federal-fracking-regulations.html 
8.6.2015 Fracking associated with smaller babies http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/08/fracking-
associated-with-smaller-babies/ 
14.8.2015 Air pollution in China is killing 4,000 people 
every day, a new study finds 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/14/air-
pollution-in-china-is-killing-4000-people-every-day-a-new-
study-finds 
7.10.2015 California governor signs aggressive climate 
change bill 
http://www.usatoday.com/videos/news/nation/2015/10/07/
73541644/ 
17.10.2015 Kerry Talks climate change http://www.usatoday.com/videos/news/nation/2015/10/17/
74125792/ 
1.12.2015 China's smog closes schools and highways www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/12/01/chinas-
smog-closes-schools-and-highways/76611310/ 
4.12.2015 Obama: climate change is a major threat http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2015/12/04/obama
-climate-change-terrorism-cbs-news-islamic-state/76773860/ 
12.12.2015 UN climate change agreement http://www.cop21.gouv.fr/en/195-countries-adopt-the-first-
universal-climate-agreement/ 
29.12.2015 Obama seeks every possibility to push climate 
change plans in 2016 
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/29/obama-
climate-change-agenda-congress-republicans-environment 
19.1.2016 China coal-burning declining http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/jan/19/chin
as-coal-burning-in-significant-decline-figures-show 
20.1.2016 2015 hottest year ever http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/jan/20/201
5-smashes-record-for-hottest-year-final-figures-confirm 
25.1.2016 Study finds that 2015 record hot year 
impossible without manmade climate change 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/jan/25/reco
rd-hot-years-near-impossible-without-manmade-climate-
change-study 
26.1.2016 Sea level rise underestimated http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/jan/26/sea-
level-rise-from-ocean-warming-underestimated-scientists-say 
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 Endorsements  
Date Output World Wide Web source 
19.9.2014 181 institutions and local governments and 656 individuals 
representing over $50 billion in divestments 
http://www.arabellaadvisors.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/Measuring-the-Global-
Divestment-Movement.pdf 
11.3.2015 London mayor endorsing divestment http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015
/mar/11/london-assembly-votes-to-divest-48bn-
pension-fund-from-fossil-fuel 
6.5.2015 Al Gore’s business partner endorses divestment http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015
/may/06/climate-change-must-be-tackled-by-
the-markets-say-city-grandees 
7.5.2015 Bank of America warns the riskiness of coal investments http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015
/may/07/coal-investments-are-increasingly-risky-
say-bank-of-america 
18.6.2015 The Pope endorses divestment http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/1
8/popes-climate-change-encyclical-calls-on-rich-
nations-to-pay-social-debt 
14.8.2015 Former EU climate chief endorses divestment http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015
/aug/14/former-eu-climate-chief-hedegaard-
backs-fossil-fuel-divestment 
21.9.2015 Divest-Invest announced number of institutions jumped to 
400 and 2,6 trillion $ 
http://350.org/cop21-divestment/ 
27.10.2015 Prince Charles endorses divestment http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015
/oct/27/prince-charles-warns-financial-sector-
charities-fossil-fuel-risk 
14.11.2015 Thomas Piketty endorses divestment http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015
/nov/14/thomas-piketty-economist-investors-
divest-fossil-fuels-ahead-climate-talks 
25.11.2015 French Parliament endorsed divestment http://ecowatch.com/2015/12/02/divest-fossil-
fuels-cop21/ 
29.11.2015 New York Mayor endorses divestment http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/sep/29/new-york-bill-de-blasio-coal-
divestment 
27.1.2016 UN endorses divestment http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016
/jan/27/un-urges-business-leaders-to-double-
investment-in-green-energy-by-2020 
29.1.2016 Copenhagen's Mayor endorses divestment http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016
/jan/29/copenhagen-set-to-divest-from-fossil-
fuels 
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 Public Authorities divestment 
announcements 
 
Date Output World Wide Web source 
23.4.2013 San Francisco commits to divest https://firstheretheneverywhere.org/2013/04/23/san-francisco-
supervisors-vote-unanimously-for-fossil-fuel-divestment/ 
25.4.2013 10 US cities commit to divest http://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2013/04/25/ten-us-
cities-commit-pursue-fossil-fuel-divestment 
6.6.2013 Dane County commits do divest http://www.nbc15.com/home/headlines/Dane-County-divests-
from-fossil-fuels-210517061.html 
6.11.2013 Northampton, MA commits to divest http://gofossilfree.org/breaking-northampton-ma-
commits-to-fossil-fuel-divestment-pushes-for-statewide-action/ 
15.3.2014 Dunedin commits to divest http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/dunedin-
council-fossil-fuel-divestment-new-zealand 
28.3.2014 Framingham, Concord and Sudbury commits 
to divest 
http://www.treehugger.com/corporate-responsibility/fossil-fuel-
divestment-spreads-massachusetts-3-towns-ten-days.html 
18.6.2014 Oakland, California commits to divest http://350.org/press-release/oakland-city-council-votes-to-
divest-from-fossil-fuel-companies/ 
21.10.2014 Ashland city commits to divest http://www.opb.org/news/article/ashland-city-council-pass-
fossil-fuel-divestment-r/ 
16.11.2014 Oxford City commits to divest http://gofossilfree.org/uk/historic-commitment-from-oxford-
city-council/ 
27.3.2015 Norway commits to divest oil pension funds http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/05/norway
s-pension-fund-to-divest-8bn-from-coal-a-new-analysis-shows 
5.5.2015 3 Danish pension funds commits to 
divestments 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/may/05/memb
ers-of-three-danish-pension-funds-vote-to-divest-from-fossil-
fuels 
5.6.2015 Norway formally commits to divest oil 
pension funds 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/05/norway
s-pension-fund-to-divest-8bn-from-coal-a-new-analysis-shows 
8.10.2015 West Yorkshire commits to divest http://gofossilfree.org/uk/press-release/kirklees-council-calls-on-
west-yorkshire-pension-fund-to-divest/ 
19.10.2015 UK’s Environment Agency pension fund 
commits to divest 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/oct/19/uk-
environment-agency-divests-landmark-move-help-meet-2c-limit 
3.11.2015 California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System (CalPERS) and California State 
Teachers’ Retirement System commits to 
divest 
http://www.sfbos.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/bdsupvrs/bosagendas/
materials/bag042313_130123.pdf 
5.11.2015 City of Münster divested http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/2433513/munster-
becomes-first-german-city-to-pledge-divestment-from-fossil-
fuels 
17.11.2015 Dutch fund PFZW to divest  http://www.reuters.com/article/netherlands-pension-fund-
emissions-idUSL8N13C1DU20151117 
23.11.2015 Albury and Armadale commits to divestment http://350.org.au/news/albury-and-armadale-city-councils-
divests-from-fossil-fuels/ 
2.12.2015 19 French cities announced to divest their 
money 
http://350.org/cop21-divestment/ 
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 Private Company divestment announcements  
Date Output World Wide Web source 
6.6.2014 BENDIGO and Adelaide Bank commits to divest http://www.afr.com/markets/commodities/meta
ls/bendigo-and-adelaide-bank-joins-super-funds-
in-fossil-fuel-rethink-20140605-iwa2n 
13.3.2015 Trending: Big Banks Bringing Sustainable Investing Further 
Into the Mainstream 
http://www.sustainablebrands.com/news_and_v
iews/leadership/brynn_mcnally/trending_big_ba
nks_bringing_sustainable_investing_further_ma 
26.3.2015 Axa commits to divest  https://cleantechnica.com/2015/05/26/axa-
divest-e500-million-coal-assets-end-2015/ 
15.6.2015 SunCommon commits to divest http://www.vermontbiz.com/news/june/suncom
mon-401k-divests-fossil-fuels-and-invests-clean-
energy 
21.9.2015 Rockefellers Brothers Fund commits to divest http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/us/heirs-
to-an-oil-fortune-join-the-divestment-
drive.html?_r=0 
19.11.2015 Nordea bank commits to divestment http://www.nordea.com/en/press-and-
news/news-and-press-releases/press-
releases/2015/11-19-09h00-nordea-goes-carbon-
neutral.html 
24.11.2015 Allianz SE commits to divest http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015
/nov/24/allianz-to-cut-investments-in-
companies-using-coal-in-favour-of-renewable-
energy 
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 Social Organizations divestment announcements 
Date Output World Wide Web source 
13.6.2013 the First Universalist Church of Pittsfield 
commits to divest 
http://gofossilfree.org/pittsfield-me-unitarian-universalists-put-
their-money-where-their-faith-is/ 
30.6.2013 United Church of Christ to become first 
U.S. denomination to move toward 
divestment from fossil fuel companies 
http://www.ucc.org/gs2013-fossil-fuel-divestment-vote 
1.8.2013 The Melbourne Unitarian Church commits 
to divest 
http://www.abc.net.au/environment/articles/2013/08/01/3816
046.htm 
6.5.2014 Stanford University commits to divest http://news.stanford.edu/news/2014/may/divest-coal-trustees-
050714.html 
10.6.2014 Union Theological Seminary commits to 
divest 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/10/union-theological-
seminary-fossil-fuels_n_5481417.html 
9.7.2014 The East minster United Church commits 
to divest 
http://www.insidetoronto.com/news-story/4621937-
eastminster-united-church-divests-from-fossil-fuel-investments/ 
29.8.2014 The Uniting Church in Australia Assembly 
commits to divest 
https://assembly.uca.org.au/news/item/1585-assembly-to-
divest-from-fossil-fuels 
17.9.2014 The Church of Sweden commits to divest http://gofossilfree.org/se/divestment-accomplished-cos/ 
8.10.2014 The University of Glasgow commits to 
divest 
http://www.gla.ac.uk/news/archiveofnews/2014/october/headl
ine_364008_en.html 
13.10.2014 The Presbyterian Church of Aotearoa New 
Zealand commits to divest 
http://gofossilfree.org/the-presbyterian-church-of-new-zealand-
joins-a-chorus-of-faith-based-action-down-under/ 
17.11.2014 The Diocese of Oxford commits to divest http://www.oxford.anglican.org/diocese-disinvest-fossil-fuels 
2.12.2014 Victoria University of Wellington commits 
to divest 
http://sustainable.org.nz/sustainability-news/victoria-
university-to-divest-from-fossil-fuels#.VyGkNDCLSVM 
23.12.2014 California Institute of Arts commits to 
divest 
http://blog.calarts.edu/2014/12/23/calarts-moves-to-divest-
from-fossil-fuels/ 
15.3.2015 George School commits to divest http://insideclimatenews.org/news/15052015/pennsylvania-
high-school-students-convince-school-divest-coal 
31.3.2015 Syracuse University commits to divest http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/science/syracuse-to-
drop-fossil-fuel-stocks-from-endowment.html?_r=0 
21.5.2015 University of Hawaii commits to divest http://350hawaii.org/?p=274&utm_content=bufferb794a&utm
_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buf
fer 
17.6.2015 Lund University commits to divest http://gofossilfree.org/se/lund-university-divest-direct-
donations-from-fossil-fuels/ 
9.9.2015 University of California commits to divest http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-ln-uc-coal-
20150909-story.html 
10.11.2015 10 UK universities commit to divest 
commits to divest 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/nov/10/ten-
uk-universities-dive 
26.11.2015 London School of Economics commits to 
divest 
http://blog.peopleandplanet.org/blog/2015/11/26/press-
release-london-school-of-economics-divest-97-2m-from-coal-
tar-sands/ 
22.12.2015 Diocese of Quebec commits to divest http://www.anglicanjournal.com/articles/diocese-of-quebec-
divests-from-fossil-fuels-mining 
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2. Appendix 
Top 200 publicly traded 
carbon heavy firms. (Fossil 
free indexes 2016.) 
